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Proving Economic Loss for In-And-Out
Traders in Light of First Solar
Daniel Roy Settana III
Abstract
Federal courts have grappled with the issue of whether or not to
include in-and-out traders in federal securities class action
lawsuits. One set of courts has excluded in-and-out traders on the
grounds that they could not prove loss causation, while another
set of courts has included in-and-out traders because of the
possibility that they could prove that they had suffered a loss. In
"ion Scheme versus First Solar, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit recently addressed what should be the correct standard
    "   
own intra-  "       !
existing circuit split. Where some circuits have adopted a
restrictive view of loss causation that requires a corrective
disclosure revealing the fraud, the Ninth Circuit adopted the view
   !   "  
be proximately
  !   "   By
   "     and-out traders can show economic loss in the absence of any
        " 
event pattern, it can be shown that an in-and-out trader has
suffered a loss in the absence of a disclosure, obviating the need
to show that a corrective statement was issued to the market.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine it is February 27, 2020. COVID-19 has slowly taken hold in
China, and the United States has remained unaffected. A few days prior,
Fraud Corporation made a fraudulent public statement leading to an
increase in the price of their stock. But now, people are realizing that,
given the fraudulent information, COVID-19 will disrupt Fraud
 ability to be profitable. This realization results in a sharp
decline in the stock price. Seeing the sharp dip in the stock price, the
purchaser, who had previously relied on      false
statements, now sells the stock for a substantial loss.
If Fraud Corporation never made the false statement, the stock price
would not have substantially dropped in value. Without the fraudulent
statements, investor expectations would not have been hindered by an
intervening event like the initial emergence of COVID-19. Realizing that
the false statement was the cause of their loss, the purchaser attempts to
sue Fraud Corporation; however, Fraud Corporation never made a
corrective disclosure to the market before the purchaser sold the stock.
Without that disclosure, courts will find that the purch   
connected to the fraud.
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In 2018, 403 federal securities class actions were filed.1 Thirty-one
percent of those class actions were filed in the Ninth Circuit.2 By the
middle of 2019, 198 new federal securities class actions were filed, and
fifteen percent of those filings were located in the Ninth Circuit.3 The
Ninth Circuit has become a popular arena for plaintiffs seeking damages
   "      -5, a rule targeting securities
fraud. With its decision in Mine       
Inc., the Ninth Circuit resolved an intra-circuit split and adopted a loss
causation standard that will substantially affect where attorneys will file
future securities class actions.
In First Solar, the Ninth Circuit held that the correct test for loss
causation was a general proximate cause test.4 According to the Ninth
Circuit the ultimate issue in First Solar      "
misstatement, as opposed to some other fact, foreseeably caused the
plaintif" !5       "  
whether in-and-      "
shares before the fraud was revealed to the public, should be included in
federal securities class actions. Although some federal courts have held
that in-and-out traders should be excluded from class action litigation
because they cannot show that they have suffered damages, other federal
courts have included in-and-out traders because there was a possibility of
showing damages. By utilizing an intervening cause pattern, this note
argues that in-and-out traders can show they have suffered damages and,
therefore, should be included in securities class actions.
Part II of this note provides background on securities litigation and
Rule 10(b)-5 violations. This section looks at the history of loss causation
and two recent Supreme Court decisions that have impacted loss causation
litigation.
Part III of this note looks at how the different circuit courts have
treated loss causation issues. This part is split into two different sections:
(1) those circuit courts that hold that the market must learn and react to the
disclosure of the fraud, and (2) those circuit courts that hold that the market
must learn and react to the disclosure of the subject of the fraud.
1

Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH
(2019),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2018-Year-in-Review.
2
See id.
3
Alexander Aganin & John Gould, Securities Class Action Filings2019 Midyear
Assessment, HARVARD LAW FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/20/securities-class-action-filings-2019-midyearassessment/.
4
Mineworkers" Pension Scheme v. First Solar, 881 F.3d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 2018).
5
Id. at 754 (citing Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)).
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Part IV of this note explores how loss causation has developed in the
Ninth Circuit post-Dura. This part is split up into two sections. The first
section explores the inter-circuit split within the Ninth Circuit. The second
 ""!!"'(!" "  #"+!!  
Pension Scheme v. First Solar, Inc.
 "   "! " #! "" " "  #"+! !  First
Solar opens the door to victims who suffered an economic loss but are
unable to bring a viable 10(b)-5 claim. The note concludes that the Ninth
 #"+! ! %!    -and-out trader to recover without a
market disclosure.
Part VI of this note argues that under an intervening cause pattern an
in-and-out trader can show they have suffered an economic loss. The
Supreme Court has misapplied the common law to require a revelation of
fraud. However, the Supreme Court has also noted that the fraud must be
the proximate cause of the loss. Utilizing the common law principles of
proximate cause, this note proposes that loss can be shown, in the absence
of a disclosure, through an intervening cause pattern.
Part VII argues that a new standard based off an intervening cause
pattern would not be investor insurance. While courts are worried that they
would be rewarding investors for losing money, this standard would only
reach those who have actually suffered a loss and can prove it to the court.

II.
A.

HISTORY OF LOSS CAUSATION

The Evolution of Securities Litigation and Loss Causation

In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress passed the Securities
 & "    ) & "*  & " !
 "") #"!"!#" !# "!*6 In other
% ! " & " %! " )"o protect investors against
#"  !"  !*7 As part of the Exchange Act, there is a
general anti-fraud provision, Section 10(b). Under this section, it is
#%#)"#! '"%""# ! !'
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
 ""$!" !*8
6

Thomas Lee Hazen, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:18 (updated Dec. 2020),
Westlaw.
7
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong.
2d Sess., 1-5 (1934)).
8
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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In 1942, a few years after the enactment of the Exchange Act, the
Securities and ( ##,$ ##- $%
10(b)-5.9 This new rule was based on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
   ,%"$# $-10; however, the new rule expanded upon
$   ) ($ &" $ % ,##$$$# d
omissions occurring in connection with either a purchase or sale of
#%"$#-11  ##.#$$'#,$ "& "$$#$
&#$"#% $ %"#"##%"$#-12
Around the early 1980s, federal courts started to recognized that a
,#%"$#"% $#% "$$$"&"%"+ 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 only if the misrepresentation of omission of the defendant
"($)%#$ $.###-13 A leading case, Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean#"*$$,$ $%#$ "&$
only that, had he known the truth, he would not have acted, but in addition
that the untruth was in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way
"# #"###-14 Over time, federal courts have "*,
private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
 #$$%$#  ##$ $ " "$  $   $.#
"!%"$#-15

B.

Loss Causation and the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has issued two opinions that have shaped the
current loss causation jurisprudence. First, the Supreme Court held in
Basic v. Levinson that plaintiffs can apply a presumption of reliance based
on the fraud-on-the-market theory.16 Then, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Broudo, the Supreme Court held that an investor may not establish loss
causation by pleading an inflated purchase price.17 This part of the note
( "#$% " %"$.###$#$'##'$#
two cases have affected the loss causation inquiry.
9

Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 12:16 (updated
Dec. 2020), Westlaw.
10
See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (limiting anti-fraud coverage to the offer and sale of
securities).
11
Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 12:16 (updated
Dec. 2020), Westlaw.
12
Id. (citing Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 1998)).
13
Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 978, 986 (D. Ariz. 2015).
14
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part,
revd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
15
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
426 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975)).
16
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
17
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
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1.  ' 
'Basic established a presumption of
reliance grounded on the fraud-on-the-market theory.18 The fraud-on-the  #     #      #'
stock reflects all materially relevant information regarding a company and
its business.19
In Basic, the Respondents were former shareholders of Basic
Incorporated who sold their shares after Basic Incorporated released a
public statement denying that they were in talks to merge with Combustion
Engineering, Inc., but before the New York Stock Exchange suspended
trading of Basic shares.20 The Respondents alleged that the defendants
violated § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 by issuing three false or
misleading pu    $ #! #
Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by
'    %21 One of the
  #   !  $!  son who traded a
 '      "       
materially misleading statement by the corporation may invoke a rebuttal
presumption that, in trading, he relied on the integrity of the price set by
 %22
The   #$  
by the fraud-on-   #% !       
 
litigation.23 The Basic      $  #
    %24 In ' !$&
is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on
  #'%25 The market performs a substantial part of the
          $   
between the seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the
   %26
The Basic '    
on fraud-on-the-market is important for loss causation because it provides
an economic theory that must serve as the basis of a loss causation
analysis. Without an efficient market, a plaintiff would fail to satisfy the
18

Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
Id. at 241-42 (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
20
Id. at 227-28.
21
Id. at 228.
22
Id. at 226.
23
Id. at 250.
24
Id. at 247.
25
Id. at 246-47 (1987) (citing Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
26
Id. at 244.
19
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transactional causation element and a court would not have to address loss
causation. By linking reliance to market integrity, the Court recognizes
""  #'  ! #%' $ %  !",!   "!
fraudulent information.

2. Dura Pharmaceuticals and the Heightened Pleadings
Standard
Unlike the court in Basic, the Dura Court addressed the pleading
# "!   !! #!" ' %"  ) " 
satisfy this requirement(a requirement that courts ca +!! #!",(
!''""!#!#"'!"!""+"
 ,  " !# "' + " "  # ! %! " #! 
!  !"",*27
In Dura, the Respondents were individuals who purchased stock in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., between April 15, 1997, and February 24,
1998.28 In their complaint, Respondents alleged that Dura made false
statements concerning drug profits and the future Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of a new asthma medicine.29 Dura falsely
stated that they expected drug sales to be profitable and that the FDA
would approve their asthmatic spray device.30 On February 24, 1998, Dura
released a corrective statement that earnings would be lower than
expected.31 &"'# ,!!  !""!$#32 Eight
months later, Dura announced that they would not receive FDA approval
for their asthmatic spray device.33 The most important part of the pleadings
%! !",! !"""   mic losses attributable to
"!!""")+  "" "'" ""
plaintiffs] . .  "'" ! # !# "!,"
"! !#  +!, " '34  # "  " # ,!
petitio  "  #!" " #",!$%"""!
properly established loss causation by showing that the price on the date
of purchase was inflated because of the misstatement.35
The Dura Court held that merely alleging an inflated purchase price
on the date of purchase was not enough to satisfy the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) requirement that loss causation
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35



Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
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be plead with particularity.36             
     "     #       #
     "               
  #!37   #              
break the causal chain:
[A]s a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction
takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at
that instant possesses equivalent value. Moreover, the
logical link between the inflated share purchase price and
any later economic loss is not invariably strong. Shares
are normally purchased with an eye toward a later sale.
But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before
the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation
will not have led to any loss. If the purchaser sells the
shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out,
the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss. If the
purchaser sells later after the truth makes its way into the
marketplace, an initially inflated purchase price might
mean a later loss. But that is far from inevitably so. When
the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a
lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which
taken separately or together account for some or all of that
lower price.38
The effect of the Dura holding is that a plaintiff has a heightened
pleading requirement for loss causation. Plaintiffs need to plead with
           #        
            #  ! 39

III.

LOSS CAUSATION CIRCUIT SPLIT

The circuits have been split over what is the correct test for loss
causation. Currently, there is a two-way split among the circuits over how
             
36
37
38
39



Id. at 345-46.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)).
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 346.
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$  ("  !) !$ ! (   !
misrepresentation.)'40 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits have each held that the market must learn and react to
the revelation of fraud. The Second, Third, and Sixth have each held that
there must be a connection between the subject of a fraudulent disclosure
and the economic loss. Before First Solar, the Ninth Circuit had an intracircuit split, utilizing both approaches.

A.

Majority Standard

The majority standard upheld by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits requires !! ! !)  ""!
conduct be revealed to the market and that the market reacts to that
information. The Supreme Court endorsed the majority standard in Erica
P. John Fund Inc. versus Halliburton Co.41
The Tenth Circuit has held that & ! !   ! " 
showing that his losses were attributable to the revelation of the fraud and
!!%!! !!!%)  ! !"!
showing a causal connection that specifically links losses to
misrep !!   ! "'42 Thus, in In re Williams
Securities Litigation! ! "! !!& "!!" 
revealed the purchasers actually benefit from the inflation and therefore
#% "%'43
The Fifth Circuit44 and the Eleventh Circuit45 use the following
framework to assess whether a plaintiff can show loss causation:
 !%  &!#   "'    
information that reveals to the market the pertinent truth
that was previously concealed or obscured by the
%)  "  $ !! ! ! 
dropped soon after the corrective disclosure; and (3)
eliminating other possible explanations for this price
drop, so that the factfinder can infer that it is more
40

Id. at 347.
See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 811 (2011) (&It is
common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged
misrepresentations were publicly known (else how would the market take them into
account?), that the stock traded in an efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took
place (between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was
revealed.)').
42
In re Williams Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 2009).
43
Id. at 1139.
44
Pub. Emp.)s Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 321 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting FindWhat Inv)r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2011)).
45
FindWhat Inv)r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2011).
41
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probable than not that it was the corrective disclosure as
opposed to other possible depressive factors that caused
  !   "   
This framework is used to show that loss causation can be proved
circumstantially.46
Similar to the T     ! 
to prove loss causation, plaintiffs in securities-fraud cases need to isolate
the extent to which a decline in stock price is due to fraud-related
      "47 In Glickenhaus & Co. v.
Household International, Inc.   ! 
       #   $
was inflated that is, it was higher than it would have been without the false
statements          "48
          !        
 #    $
     #reveal to the market in some
       $        
#        
     $"49 In Singer v. Reali,
the Fourth Circuit held that there must be a corrective disclosure, or series
of corrective disclosures, that reveals the truth to the market, prompting
the stock price deflation.50
        ! 
proving         #   
burden of showing that [their] losses were attributable to the revelation of
            $ $"51

46

Amedisys, 769 F.3d at 321 (quoting FindWhat Inv$r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d
1282, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2011)).
47
Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int$l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 421 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Hubbard v. BankAtl. Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 725-26 (11th Cir. 2012)); see
Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223, 232 (4th Cir. 2004).
48
Glickenhaus, 787 F.3d at 415.
49
Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 446 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Katyle v. Penn Nat$l
Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 473 (4th Cir. 2005)).
50
See id. at 446.
51
Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int$l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA)
LLC., 752 F.3d 82, 95 (2014) (citing In re Williams Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th
Cir. 2009)).
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The minority standard upheld by the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuit
has required that the subject of a misrepresentation or omission be revealed
to the market.
  !$# "  ## )# "#" "" $"# 
# $"# "& ## +# "" &"  !", !"$#  #
#,"$##!$+and that the loss [was] caused by the
materialization of the . .   !",  ( # #," 
!$*52 )!""$"#! $!""#!###
+#subject of the fraudulent statement or omission was the cause of the
#$ "" "$!,*53 ) # # " # +"#!#  $"
connection between the content of the alleged misstatements or omissions
#!#$("$!,!$&#*54
 '# !$#  ## ) ""### ! "" " #
+!'#$",%"## loss if the risk that caused the loss was
within the zone of risk concealed by the misrepresentations and omissions
("#%"#!*55
 !!$#"###("#"&)##t
was the very facts about which the defendant lied which causes its
$!"*56 In McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, the Third Circuit stated that
!!)##! $"#""$"#"&#  #"
$"# "& ## !#'," !! !"#ration defaults and consequent
litigation risks (the very facts that Ernst & Young allegedly omitted) were
"$"###!$"#  #,"""*57 Unlike
the majority of Circuits, the Third Circuit does not require a corrective
disclosure that reveals new information about a fraudulent
misrepresentation; the Third Circuit requires that the underlying facts be a
"$"###!#,"onomic loss.

IV.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT,S NEW LOSS CAUSATION STANDARD

 # !$#," "  First Solar resolved a split in the
!$#," !! !#   ## # !!# #"# &"  !
52

In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 261 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Lentell v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)).
53
Id. (citing Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95
(2d. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)).
54
Id. (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005)).
55
Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 830 F.3d 376, 384
(6th Cir. 2016).
56
McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP., 494 F.3d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1997)).
57
Id. at 429.
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proximate cause test.58  !f cases represents the
 #        
   $        59 On the other hand,
    !      
recover o    $   "60
The intra-circuit split mirrors the nationwide circuit split on loss causation.
In First Solar, the Ninth Circuit has been asked to determine the correct
test for loss causation.

A.

Intra-Circuit Split

    !    
    $      "61
        !      
"62 The defendants advocated for the view expressed by Daou and
its progeny. The Daou approach is similar to the approach adopted by a
minority of the circuits. While the plaintiffs advocated for the view
expressed by Metzler and its progeny, a view expressed by the majority of
circuits.
Daou and its progeny represent the view that it is the disclosure of the
  $        $ 
that satisfied loss causation.63 In Daou, the defendant, Daou Systems, Inc.,
!   nd supported computer networking systems for
      "64 The plaintiffs alleged that Daou had
fraudulently inflated their stock price by recognizing revenue before it was
actually earned. Additionally, Daou acquired eleven companies, and its
executives, and their family members, sold nearly 2.5 million shares at the
inflated price for a gain of $54.57 million.65
The court held that that loss causation was properly plead because the
!       $rue financial health,
the result of prematurely recognizing revenue before it was earned, led to
58

Mineworkers$ Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 754 (2018).
Id. at 752 (2018) (citing Nuveen Municipal High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of
Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013)); Berson v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc., 527
F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Daou Systems Inc., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005)).
60
First Solar, 881 F. 3d at 752 (citing Oregon Public Employees Retirement Fund v.
Apollo Group Inc., 774 F.3d 598 (9th Cir. 2014); Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880
(9th Cir. 2014); In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376 (9th Cir.
2010); Metzler Investment GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2008)).
61
Smilovits v. First Solar Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 978, 987 (D. Ariz. 2015).
62
Id.
63
In re Daou Systems Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).
64
Id. at 1012.
65
Id. at 1013.
59
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 %              &  
  &$66     #    &  
precipitously after defendants began to reveal figures showing the
 "&     $67 The decision in Daou did not
mention a revelation of fraud, but rather, the Court repeatedly mentioned
 "&#  $ #ue
    $             ! 
adequately plead.68
Several years later, the Ninth Circuit articulated the proper test for loss
causation in Nuveen Municipal High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of
Alameda. In Nuveen,  "         #
           "$69 Nuveen
purchased $17,750,000 in face value of the notes that the City of Alameda
were selling.70 In 2008, it was determined that the Notes could not be
refinanced and therefore the telecom system was sold for approximately
$15 million.71 Nuveen received approximately $10 million towards the
principal of the notes they held, but were still owed another $10 million.
The allegations against Alameda were    #    
contained inflated and unrealistic projections that materially overstated the
"&   $72
           "     # 
plaintiff can satisfy loss causation " !   %  
misrepresented or omitted the very facts that were a substantial factor in
  &&$73 #  
sine qua non of loss causation, which may be shown even where the
allege "  $74
 "& Metzler
diverged from the standard set in Daou. In Metzler, the defendant,
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., was one of the  &     
private for-profit colleges.75 Metzler, an institutional investor, alleged that
Corinthian engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices in order to
maximize the amount of federal funding that they received.76 Title IV
66

Id. at 1026.
Id.
68
Id. at 1026-27.
69
Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th
Cir. 2013).
70
Id. at 1117.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1120.
74
Id.
75
Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
76
Id.
67
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funding was a major source of revenue for Corinthian.77 The complaint
alleged that the fraudulent practices resulted in the artificial inflation of
 ( 78 !"  (! 
stock price dropped.79
While the court in Metzler cited Daou to support their decision, the
court ultimately diverged from Daou by holding that loss causation
required that the market must learn and react to the fraud.80  ! (
"# %   ! $! Daou because their
complaint alleged that the market learned of and reacted to this fraud, as
  $         (  
 $&81 The Ninth Circuit in Metzler     %  
must allege that the practices that the plaintiff contends are fraudulent were
"   ! ! &82
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed their Metzler decision in Loos v.
Immersion Corp. In Loos, the defendant, Immersion Corporation, was a
public-traded technology company.83 The complaint alleged that
Immersion reported false information regarding revenue over a period of
several quarters.84   %  " "      
   '!!(! ! 
#  '  "!    (&85 Citing Ninth Circuit precedent,
!   %! !! !  
    '     ! 
$         (  nancial health
$(&86
    ! (  Smilovits
v. First Solar, Inc. As the court noted in Smilovits  %! "
 !    #  ( !!     
loss&87 !  ! %#   ! "&88

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88



Id.
Id. at 1055-56.
Id. at 1059.
See id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 883.
Id. at 885-86.
Id. at 887-88.
Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d. 978, 987 (D. Ariz. 2015).
Id.
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In First Solar " " %  !+ ! 
 !"   #  $!" ! %  # !  !"   +!
publicly traded securities.89 The defendant, First Solar, Inc., is a producer
of photovoltaic solar panel modules.90 The plaintiff asserts that during the
class period, April 30, 2008 to February 28, 2012, First Solar Inc.
discovered manufacturing defects. Subsequently, First Solar Inc.
("!"!!  !""!"!""!
  "! "" !"""!)91 During the
!! (  !" +!!"   ! " '
$50 per ! )92 There were steep declines in the stock price following
" !# " '!!# !""  "(""!
!!" !"! "  "#    !"  +!    !"
 !#"!)93
First Solar filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.94 The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part, finding that
there were material issues of fact.95 Further, the district court stayed the
case to resolve the competing lines of cases and determine the correct test
for loss causation.96
At the Ninth Circuit, the Court found that the correct test for loss
causation is a general proximate cause test.97 In their reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit relied on their recent decision in Lloyd v. CVB Financial Corp., a
case decided after the appeal was filed in Smilovits. In Lloyd, the court
!""""(*!!#!"!("&"-")# '!"  
a("$ "')%'! " ""#!!!+)98 Citing Dura, the
Ninth Circuit in Lloyd # "" (" #"" !!# ! %"  "
"+! !!""" ! ! " ! "  "  !'
#!""+!!!)99 In First Solar, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
their decision in Lloyd did not suggest that the only way to prove loss
causation was a revelation of fraud.100 !!""!(#"'
pleaded a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100



Mineworkers+ Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 752 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id. (citing Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id.
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 %    "  #    101 The Ninth Circuit
"   $&! #'   
  %102 The fact that the Court has previously approved
of one theory does not imply their rejection of other theories.103 $
#  #   %104 The key
 $" '  
  #  '%105

V.

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON IN-AND-OUT TRADERS

  'Dura, there has been a question
over whether or not an in-and-out trader would be able to recover in
securities fraud litigation.106
Post-Dura, the only circuit court to address in-and-out traders at classcertification has been the Second Circuit. On a motion for class
certification, the Second Circuit declined to include in-and-out traders in
a securities class action.107    $    
fail to connect the decline in the price of Flag stock to any corrective
     #     %108 The Second
       "        $ " 
conclusion that the in-and-out traders could prove loss causation as a
  "%109 Instead of remanding the case back to the district court
to determine whether in-and-out traders could be included in the class, the
        $     !  
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the in-and-out traders will even
&! #' !      "  
#  !  %110
Pre-Dura, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of in-and-out traders
in Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc.111 Since Wool $  
precedent has long held that in-and-out traders are appropriately included
  %112 In Wool, the plaintiff was an in-and-  $"
101

Id. (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)).
Id. at 754.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 753 (citing Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016)).
106
In re BearingPoint, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 534, 543 (E.D. VA. 2006).
107
See In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 574 F.3d 29, 41 (2d Cir. 2009).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 39.
110
Id. at 40.
111
See Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled
on other grounds by Hollinger v. Titan Cap. Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990).
112
McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., 267 F.R.D. 690, 698 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
102
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purchased stock during the period of misrepresentation but sold it before
any disclosure which either partially or completely corrected the
  !!'113 !"!!& ! "%
actual damages and therefore had no cause of action under federal
securities law'114  ! "! " !! & "  !
forces are independent of corrective disclosures, an in-and-out trader . . .
may suffer recoverable damages . . . even in the absence of corrective
  " '115
!! ""!(  n Dura&"! $!
in-and-out traders should be included in classes have struggled with the
" !'116  ! ! "! & !   " $! "( 
discussion of inflated purchase as it relates to loss causation overturns the
Ninth "!(     Wool'117 In In re Juniper Networks, Inc.
Securities Litigation, the District Court excluded from class certification
in-and-out traders who had sold their securities prior to the public
dissemination of a curative disclosure.118 The Juniper court reasoned that
traders who sold their securities prior to the public dissemination of a
"!#   " &! % #      
"(   !! '119 Contrary to Juniper, some courts
in the Ninth Circuit have included in-and-out traders in class
certification.120 In McGuire v. Dendreon Corp.!"!& "!!and-out traders are appropriately included in the class at the class
!! !'121 The McGuire court r  !! &-and-out
traders could prove that they suffered a loss when they sold their shares
" !%%" ! !"!!  !!'122

VI.

IN-AND-OUT TRADERS AND PROXIMATE CAUSE

 !"!( ! First Solar has opened the door
to allowing in-and-out traders to recover in securities fraud litigation. As
several courts have noted, the Dura decision did not actually reach the

113

Wool, 818 F.2d at 1437.
Id.
115
Id.
116
McGuire, 267 F.R.D. at 698.
117
Id.
118
In re Juniper Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 584, 594 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
119
Id.
120
See McGuire, 267 F.R.D. at 699; see also Buttonwood Tree Value Partners, LP v.
Sweeney, No. 10-cv-537, 2013 WL 12125980, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
121
McGuire, 267 F.R.D. at 699.
122
Id.
114
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economics underlying loss causation.123 The Supreme Court in Dura $"
focused m# !#  & 
       ! #  % 124
However, courts have still cited Dura to construct their respective loss
causation standard. Given this conflict in jurisprudence and the Ninth
! & First Solar, the Ninth Circuit has provided a
pathway for in-and-out traders to show they suffered a loss.

A.

Loss Causation is Rooted in the Common Law

Loss causation bears a striking resemblance to common law torts.125
However, the Supreme Court has misapplied the Restatement of Torts to
require markets to learn of fraudulent activities before a plaintiff may
recover.126 The right test for security loss causation is a general proximate
cause test.127 In Dura, the Supreme Court recognized that securities fraud
cases resemble the common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions.128
However, the Court did not go far enough in their analysis of the common
law.

1. The Supreme Court has Misapplied the Restatement
(Second) of Torts
The Dura court relied on §§ 525 and 548A Restatement (Second) of
    !    #    ! & $ 
!% ! 129  #  $ 
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary
loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
mis  %130 Additionally, §       $  !! 
misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action
123

See In re CIGNA Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 353 (E.D. Penn. 2006); see
also McGuire, 267 F.R.D. at 698.
124
In re CIGNA, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
125
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) ($Judicially implied
private securities fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common law deceit
and misrepresentation actions.%) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 744 (1975)).
126
In 2016, the Second Circuit, following the Supreme Court&s lead, also misapplied the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 548A cmt. b to support a requirement that fraudulent
activity be disclosed to the market. See In re Vivendi, S.A., 838 F.3d 223, 261 (2nd Cir.
2016).
127
Mineworkers& Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 2018).
128
Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
129
See id. at 343-44.
130
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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or inaction in reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be
expected to result from the relia !131 While neither of these provisions
expressly calls for the market disclosure, the Court specifically relied on a
part of comment b to § 548A:
[t]hus one who misrepresents the financial condition of a
corporation in order to sell its stock will become liable to
a purchaser who relies upon the misinformation for the
loss that he sustains when the facts as to the finances of
the corporation become generally known and as a result
the value of the shares is depreciated on the market,
because that is the obviously foreseeable result of the facts
misrepresented.132
While courts have relied on this part of the comment,133 the comment
does not foreclose the opportunity that a loss could be proved in a different
manner.
The structure of the comment does not mandate that the market must
become generally aware of the fraud and then react to the fraud. The true
               
be considered in the light of its tendency to cause those losses and the
likelihood th  ! 134 The Supreme Court has interpreted an
isolated sentence as a limiting factor in their loss causation analysis.135
           !
   !   in this or that manner;
(2) so; (3) hence, consequently; and (4) as an example.136 When read in the
        !    
either (3) or (4). These two definitions do not create a standard but rather
offer an example of what would satisfy the ultimate meaning of the
comment, pecuniary losses must reasonably result from the
misrepresentation.
131

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (AM. L. INST. 1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
133
See Dura, 544 U.S. at 344; see also In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 262
(2d Cir. 2016) (holding that it was sufficient that the alleged loss resulted from the relevant
truth leaking out from events constructively disclosing the fraud!).
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
135
Dura, 544 U.S. at 344 ( Indeed, the Restatement of Torts, in setting forth the judicial
consensus, says that a person who "misrepresents the financial condition of a corporation
in order to sell its stock# becomes liable to a relying purchaser "for the loss# the purchaser
sustains# when the facts . . . become generally known# and "as a result# share value
"depreciate[s].#!).
136
Thus, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 654 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1998).
132
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2. Proximate Cause Standard
The loss causation standard in securities actions is rooted in common
law negligence.137 In a typical negligence case, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant owed a duty, the defendant breached that duty, the defendant
caused the harm, and the plaintiff suffered damages. In regard to the
   #! %  &
            $138
       & 139
      & ! 
Factual causation is equated with the but-for causation standard.140 In
order to satisfy the factual cause requirement, the plaintiff must prove that
  &      & 141 As Prosser
    #   &     
if the event would not have occurred but for the conduct; conversely, the
 &       
    $142 The Restatement (Third) reiterates the but-for
   #          
act, the outcome would no   $143 Proof of factual causation
alone, while necessary, is not sufficient to establish legal causation.144
In addition to factual causation, the plaintiff must prove that the cause
was within the scope of liability. The central purpose of proximate cause
!#       !    
the potential harms"risks"   &   $145 Two
distinct patterns exist under proximate cause: direct harm pattern and
intervening cause harm pattern.146 The direct harm pattern occurs when
#  !     "call it Harm A"but an
entirely different harm"Harm B"$147   !# 
simply ask whether the harm that occurred was foreseeable, that is,
whether it was one of the general kinds of harm that was unreasonably
  !  & $148 In the intervening cause pattern,
137

Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 829-830 (2009).
138
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).
139
DAN B. DOBBS ET. AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 185 (2d ed. 2019).
140
Fisch, supra note 137, at 830.
141
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 183, at 614.
142
W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266
(5th ed. 1984).
143
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
144
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 183, at 614.
145
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010).
146
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 201, at 693.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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! 
                    
harm is some other force or pe"149
The intervening cause pattern is limited by superseding causes. Under
this pattern, there is a secondary act that has an effect on the causation
analysis. If the secondary act is a new cause that comes into play after the
 #      the secondary act is an intervening cause.150
However, if the intervening act is the only proximate cause of the harm,
then the intervening cause is called a superseding act.151 A defendant is not
liable when an intervening act is also a superseding act. As  #
explained,
[t]he rule is that if the intervening cause itself is part
of the risk negligently created by the defendant, or if
it is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
negligent conduct, then it is not a superseding cause
at all. In that case, the defendant is not relieved of
liability merely because some other person or force
triggered the injury.152
When courts utilize a proximate cause inquiry, the extent of the
liability is determined by whether the intervening cause is foreseeable.153
The focus is not on the foreseeability of the intervening act154, but rather,
the focus is on the foreseeability of the nature155 and the manner156 of the
harm done.
While negligence requires foreseeability, intentional torts are not
bound by the same restriction; securities actions require a different
               ! 
          #     
            
 #       to
  "157 As the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 33(a) states:
!                  
      "158

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158



Id.
Id.
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 204, at 706-07.
Id.
Id.
See id.
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 205, at 711.
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 206, at 711.
Fisch, supra note 137, at 832.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 33(A) (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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While courts correctly recognize the general proximate cause test as
the correct inquiry, it is through an intervening cause pattern that loss
causation can be shown in the absence of any corrective disclosure.

B.

Showing Loss Causation

The disclosure requirement imposed by the court is an unnecessary
limitation to the loss causation analysis. As the Ninth Circuit correctly
pointed out, there are an infinite number of ways to prove loss causation.159
However, most courts have chosen the most obvious example, a decline in
stock price after a public announcement reveali   
fraudulent conduct, as the standard for securities litigation. Returning to
the hypothetical laid out at the beginning of this article, we can show loss
causation can occur in the absence of a disclosure.

159



Mineworkers Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2018).
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The proposed loss causation analysis relies on the intervening cause
pattern. Using FIGURE 1, the intervening pattern shows that a plaintiff
can be harmed in the absence of a market disclosure. In the model, the
defendant makes a fraudulent statement at point A. Shortly after the
fraudulent statement is made, the plaintiff purchases the stock at the
inflated price, B1. However, had the defendant not made the fraudulent
statements, the plaintiff would have purchased the stock at a non-inflated
price, B2. Shortly after the purchase, an intervening event occurs, forcing
the stock price to plummet. Yet, without the fraudulent statement, investor
expectations would not have been affected by the intervening event. The
stock price without the fraudulent price baked in would have remained
level. Due to the intervening event, the purchaser sells the stock at point
D2, resulting in damages. Had the fraudulent statements never been made,
the purchaser would have owned stock at price D1.
This model tends to agree with illustration 2 to § 548A. This
illustration does not require the market to become generally aware of the
fraud in order for the plaintiff to recover pecuniary losses. The illustration
states:
A, seeking to buy bonds for investment, approaches B. B offers A the
bonds of X Oil Corporation, fraudulently misrepresenting its financial
condition. In reliance upon these statements, A buys the bonds. After his
purchase conditions in the oil industry become demoralized and as a result
of financial losses the X Oil Corporation becomes insolvent. Because of
the insolvency A suffers a pecuniary loss greater than that which would
have resulted from the deterioration of conditions in the industry alone. It
is found that if the financial condition of the Corporation had been as
represented it would probably have weathered the storm and not become
insolvent. B is subject to liability to A for the additional pecuniary loss
resulting from the insolvency.160
This illustration is based off Hotaling versus A.B. Leach & Co, Inc.,
et al. In Hotaling, Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, said that the
                       
     
 161     
long as the fraud continued to operate and to induce the continued holding
of the bond, all loss flowing naturally from that fraud may be regarded as
     162 Pecuniary losses were not dependent on the
market becoming aware of the fraud; pecuniary losses were dependent on
a connection between the loss and the fraud.

160
161
162



RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A illustration 2 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co, Inc., et al., 159 N.E. 870, 873 (1928).
Id.
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The key to our intervening cause pattern is the absence of a
superseding event. A superseding event destroys the chain of causation.
Looking at the illustration, the scenario was dependent on the company
being able to weather a collapse in    " 
without the fraud factored in, had fallen with the rest of the oil industry,
the loss would not be linked to the fraud. The loss would be linked to
overwhelming market conditions.
While the illustration presents an extreme example, the model still
holds under less extreme conditions. As our model shows, an in-and-out
trader just needs to show that the actual stock price fell below the
contrafactual stock price while the actual stock price was still influenced
by the fraud.

VII.

AN INTERVENING CAUSE PATTERN WOULD NOT BE
INVESTOR INSURANCE

Courts have been cautious in their rulings on loss causation in order to
prevent the conversion of Rule 10b-      "
insurance.163 However, dismissing a plaintiff who was wrongfully harmed
because they sold their shares before the market was made explicitly aware
of fraudulent acts ignores the intent of Rule 10(b)-"
              
purchasing  !164 As the Supreme Court acknowledged
in Basic        
 !165
In-and-out traders rely on the market to accurately reflect the true
financial condition of the company whose stock is being purchased. When
                 "
misstatements, in-and-out traders are also hurt. In-and-out traders have
given up alternative opportunities because of misleading statements.
 "    
claims, these claims will not be insurance for those who lost money. These
new plaintiffs will still need to show the court that their loss was linked to
a fraudulent statement made by the defendant and not the result of a
superseding event.

163

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).
Thomas Lee Hazen, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12:16 (2019).
165
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase
Systems Inc., 555 F.Supp. 535,538 (SDNY 1982)).
164
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CONCLUSION
While the Ninth Circuit resolved their own circuit split in First Solar,
 '  !  
recover beyond the Ninth Circuit. In-and-out traders are usually excluded
    #  #'  
or omission because they exited their position prior to a market disclosure.
!   ' $erlying facts
 #   %166 As the Court noted, there
 $& #'     
 #"  %167 Since it is the facts that affect the stock price,
a market disclosure is a possibility but not a condition for proving loss
causation.
Under a general proximate cause standard, it can be shown that
investors can show loss causation in the absence of a corrective disclosure.
The purpose of Rule 10(b)-5 was to protect investors from being duped
into purchasing stocks. By preventing in-and-out traders from recovering
in the absence of a corrective disclosure, courts are going against the intent
    'First Solar was
a step in the right direction, it will take action from the Supreme Court to
open the courts to all those who have been harmed. As one SEC
$!     '!%168

166

Mineworkers' Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id.
168
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Remarks of Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of Federal
Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)).
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